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‘Go and stop progress’. 
Kazimir Malevich to Daniil Kharms1 
  
 
These days, the philosophical and metaphysical concept of the absurd enjoys a less than 
stellar reputation. Not that it ever had widespread appeal,2 but the years have not been 
kind to it. A brainstorming session on the most common associations with absurdism 
would surely yield the likes of ‘bleakness’, ‘pointlessness’, and ‘despair’. Frequently 
conflated with nihilism,3 it is routinely assumed to be some sort of conceptual wasteland 
fraught with moral relativity4 and plagued by an inescapable sense of sterility, one 
heightened by its ‘built-in obsolescence’5 and its hopelessly paradoxical nature.6 
 The literary and dramatic counterpart of absurdism – and here the emphasis rests 
                                                 
1 In Matvei Yankelevich, ‘Introduction: The Real Kharms’, in Today I Wrote Nothing: 
The Selected Writings of Daniil Kharms, ed. and trans. by Matvei Yankelevich (New 
York, Woodstock, London: Overlook Duckworth, 2007), pp. 11-40 (p. 25). 
2 Arnold Hinchliffe, The Absurd (London: Methuen, 1969), p. 45. 
3 Neil Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2006), p. 4. 
4 Hinchliffe, The Absurd, p. 37. 
5 Ibid., p. 81. 
6 Ibid., p. 91. 
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heavily on the works famously grouped together by Martin Esslin under the eclectic 
banner of the ‘Theatre of the Absurd’ – seldom fares much better. Dismissed as acolytes 
of ‘a ferociously avant-garde movement with an exclusively existential vision’,7 the 
Western practitioners of the Theatre of the Absurd are often deemed to be ‘deeply 
steeped in despair and pessimism [… ;] the European absurdist sees life as being absurd 
and meaningless, so absurd and meaningless in fact that he contemplates suicide as a 
solution’.8 This would seem to explain why some East European theatre critics find ‘the 
Western absurd play’ to be lacking in the department of social responsibility.9 
 This article does not set out to deny the indisputable nihilist streak which 
underlies absurdist thought. Rather, its first main aim is to dispel the myth that a 
preoccupation with the absurd necessarily leads to apathy, lethargy, and an acute sense of 
helplessness. To name but one possible example, it is often too readily presumed that 
Jean Paul Sartre’s later emphasis on the importance of social and political awareness 
resulted from an abandonment of absurdity as opposed to being a logical next step. 
 However, absurdism, it will be argued, is much more than a self-indulgent dirge 
for the living. It comes from a deep-seated unrest, and it reacts to perceived 
transgressions. It packs a very powerful punch, and this force need not be simply 
                                                 
7 Robert Brustein, The Theatre of Revolt: An Approach to Modern Drama (Chicago: 
Elephant Paperbacks, 1991), p. 377. 
8 Odun Balogun, ‘Characteristics of Absurdist African Literature: Taban lo Liyong’s 
Fixions – A Study in the Absurd’, African Studies Review, 27 (1984), 41-55 (p. 46). 
9 Marketa Goetz-Stankiewicz, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Theatre of the Absurd or the 
Jobless Jester’, Pacific Coast Philology, 7 (1972), 54-64 (p. 57). 
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channelled through and presented in its raw form, as is frequently deemed to be the case 
in the West: it can also be instrumentalized ‘constructively’ by being subordinated to 
ulterior goals, as examples from Africa and Eastern Europe show us. In a word, then, the 
argument is that it is impossible to make sense of the absurd in all its philosophical and 
literary manifestations without taking stock of its attritional character – be its resistive 
force steered against death, modernity, totalitarianism, colonialism, or simply the status 
quo. 
 
1. UNDERSTANDING THE ABSURD 
In his book The Absurd in Literature, Neil Cornwell mentions different possible 
definitions of the absurd. On the one hand, the absurd can be regarded as a theme, a 
‘timeless disposition or quality, which may be seen to pertain – at the very least here and 
there – throughout the history of literature, and certainly from some of the works of the 
Greeks’.10 On the other hand, it may very well ‘be considered a prominent period style, 
observable in the second half of the twentieth century’,11 and Ramona Fotiade does not 
mince her words when describing its importance: ‘The twentieth century might, with 
hindsight, be described as the conflicting site of successive avant-garde waves that bear 
witness to the presence of a single unifying, pervasive concern with the Absurd’.12 
 This concern is manifest in the many literary works it spawned. These works 
                                                 
10 The Absurd in Literature, p. 311. 
11 Ibid., pp. 310-11. 
12 Conceptions of the Absurd: From Surrealism to the Existential Thought of Chestov and 
Fondane (Oxford: Legenda, 2001), p. 1. 
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appeared to share ‘a certain vision of the world and of the laws which govern it, a certain 
linguistic rapport’ and to ‘resemble each other in a striking manner, even when their 
authors could not have known or read one another, whether for reasons of language or of 
temporal distance’.13 Noticing how many of them were written for the stage, Esslin, 
‘having appropriated the concept of the absurd in the first place from Camus’, chose ‘to 
apply it to what he identified as a new theatrical trend’:14 the Theatre of the Absurd. This 
notion has been as influential as it has been controversial, but even some of the more 
sceptic critics have admitted that Esslin’s premise has a solid footing.15 
 Having said that, it must be pointed out that the absurd remains ‘a disposition 
rather than anything approaching an overall concrete twentieth-century movement’.16 
Esslin was careful to stress that the dramatists discussed in his book The Theatre of the 
Absurd ‘do not form part of any self-proclaimed or self-conscious school or 
movement’,17 as the essence of the Theatre of the Absurd ‘lies in the free and unfettered 
exploration by each of the writers concerned of his own individual vision’.18 This 
freedom contributes to the notorious elusiveness of the absurd; claiming that absurdity is 
                                                 
13 Jean-Philippe Jaccard, ‘Daniil Kharms in the Context of Russian and European 
Literature of the Absurd’, in Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd: Essays and 
Materials, ed. by Neil Cornwell (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 49-70 (p. 49). 
14 Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature, p. 310. 
15 Hinchliffe, The Absurd, p. 92. 
16 Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature, p. 99. 
17 Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1962), p. 15. 
18 Ibid., p. 177. 
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‘a relative not absolute notion’19 is almost an understatement. The absurd resists 
taxonomies, and so do absurdist works: ‘[t]he concept of “literature of the absurd” is 
extremely vague and often permits the ranging under the same term of a whole series of 
disparate works which often have no common denominator but their obscure nature’.20 
 Besides from obscure, some critics seem to consider such works aloof to the point 
of solipsism. It is not too hard to understand where they are coming from: existentialism, 
‘not a philosophy but a type of philosophy’ both very flexible and ancient21 which is the 
driving force behind many absurdist works – but, crucially, not all of them, as we shall 
see when we discuss Kharms – ‘concerns itself first and foremost with the subject, rather 
than the object’,22 and this promotes inwardness; moreover, ‘[t]he emergence of the 
preoccupation with the absurd in the early twentieth century can also be associated with 
the steady rise of nihilism in Europe’.23 Thus, in Hinchliffe’s opinion, ‘Absurd Theatre is 
timeless, universal, and philosophical’, as opposed to ‘topical, particular, and political’.24 
 That presumed detachedness probably plays a role in the way those works’ tone is 
                                                 
19 Hinchliffe, The Absurd, p. 90. 
20 Jaccard, ‘Daniil Kharms in the Context of Russian and European Literature of the 
Absurd’, pp. 49-50. 
21 John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and 
Bultmann (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 15. 
22 Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature, p. 5; see also Macquarrie, An Existentialist 
Theology, p. 16. 
23 Fotiade, Conceptions of the Absurd, p. 3. 
24 The Absurd, p. 4. 
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often interpreted as being ‘ridiculous, if not downright comical’.25 The ‘black humour’ so 
commonly associated with the practitioners of the absurd26 is often somewhat heedlessly 
mistaken for sheer nonsense, but Cornwell draws a clear line between nonsense and the 
absurd: ‘The basic difference may be that pointlessness as the point of nonsense is 
essentially non-serious; pointlessness as the point of the absurd, however, is (potentially, 
at least) altogether more serious’.27 
 This seriousness is crucial for a proper understanding of the absurd, and it flies in 
the face of charges of apathy or aloofness. In fact, according to Esslin, ‘[t]he Theatre of 
the Absurd forms part of the unceasing endeavour of the true artists of our time to breach 
this dead wall of complacency and automatism’.28 Such aims in no way run counter to the 
philosophical framework of the absurd, as introspection and self-awareness must not be 
confused with inwardness and passivity. Existential thought provides a useful analogy: 
 
In existential thought, resignation does not primarily refer to a disengagement 
from social and political commitments insofar as they relate to outer rather than 
inner determinations of thought. Resignation more adequately designates what 
seems to be the only sensible attitude when man comes to confront the 
implacable truth of human mortality.29 
                                                 
25 Marc Blanchard, ‘Goodbye, Sisyphus’, South Central Review, 15 (1998), 8-18 (p. 11). 
26 Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature, p. 84. 
27 Ibid., p. 22. 
28 The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 291. 




Yet, as will be argued later on in this article, even in this qualified sense ‘resignation’ is 
almost unfailingly too strong a word for any absurdist worth their salt. ‘Ultimately’, 
argues Esslin, ‘a phenomenon like the Theatre of the Absurd does not reflect despair or a 
return to dark irrational forces but expresses modern man’s endeavour to come to terms 
with the world in which he lives’.30 After all, deciding to face head-on the prospect of 
living a frail and fleeting life in a chaotic, even hostile universe is hardly synonymous 
with defeatism. 
 Far from meekly accepting their cruel fate, then, absurdist artists, like any other 
artists, cannot truly accept that powerlessness is the sole defining feature of human life – 
otherwise why would they keep creating art at all? Absurdity cannot be reduced to the 
awareness of a particular state of affairs; it is also, in its very essence, a call to action. 
This is best exemplified by its indelible connection to the twentieth-century avant-garde 
movements: Cornwell draws attention to the fact that the avant-garde, an indissoluble 
‘aspect of modernity and modernism’ which made up ‘the building blocks of the absurd’, 
did not just provide a laboratory for experimentation with new artistic forms, but also 
fiercely ‘stood for revolt against tradition’.31 
 Here it is important to make a distinction between the thesis presented in this 
article and previous attempts – notably by Robert Brustein and George Wellwarth, both 
writing in the 1960s – at defining the works of Beckett and likeminded playwrights as 
being motivated by ‘protest’ or ‘revolt’. Though on the face of it germane to the concept 
                                                 
30 The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 313. 
31 The Absurd in Literature, p. 74. 
8 
 
of the absurd as resistance, the interpretations devised by Wellwarth and Brustein fail to 
account for the thematic richness and complexity of many of the writers discussed in this 
article. 
 Wellwarth enticingly begins his book The Theater of Protest and Paradox by 
arguing that the plays written after WWII share ‘a common theme (protest) and a 
common technique (paradox)’,32 but unfortunately, as Michael Y. Bennett notes, this 
point is never properly addressed later on.33 Instead, Wellwarth seems to regard modern 
dramatists as nihilists whose bleak views sport varying shades of obstinacy. For example, 
he claims that for Beckett – the ‘prophet of negation and sterility’ who preaches 
‘intellectual nihilism’34 – ‘all knowledge is an illusion’, thought ‘is useless’, and ‘the 
concerns and actions of human beings are meaningless’.35 The logical implication of this 
worldview, and of Wellwarth’s appraisal of avant-garde drama as ‘the comedy of nihilism 
and despair’,36 is that the playwrights’ ‘protest against the social order and the human 
condition’37 cannot amount to much more than a sterile paroxysm. 
 Similarly, Brustein’s analysis of modern theatre as one of revolt would seem to be 
                                                 
32 The Theater of Protest and Paradox: Developments in the Avant-Garde Drama (New 
York: New York University Press, 1964), p. x. 
33 Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd: Camus, Beckett, Ionesco, Genet, and Pinter 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 20. 
34 The Theater of Protest and Paradox, pp 51, 41. 
35 Ibid., pp. 42, 44. 
36 Ibid., p. 16. 
37 Ibid., p. 53. 
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perfect for the topic at hand. Indeed, this article explores or at least corroborates several 
points already raised by Brustein, such as: the Romantic influence on that attitude of 
revolt;38 the artists’ indebtedness to the Nietzschean idea that ‘the only alternative to 
nihilism lay in revolt’;39 the crucial suggestion of the impossibility of resigning oneself to 
the absurd;40 and the equally vital use of the keywords ‘ambivalence’, ‘tension’, and 
‘conflict’ when describing ‘the central dialectic of the modern drama’.41 However, 
Brustein’s thoughtful study is marred by his brief and offhand account of ‘the 
absurdists’,42 the ragtag group of writers who ‘never stray too far from the limits laid 
down by Dada’ (which limits would those be, one wonders) and whom he denies the 
honour of belonging to his main corpus. Purporting to channel Artaud, or at least 
anchoring his judgement on the French writer’s vision, Brustein considers Beckett to be 
‘too wan and listless’, Ionesco ‘too frivolous’, and ‘the rest of the “theatre of the absurd” 
[…] too nihilistic’.43 
 However, it would surely be worthwhile to rehabilitate the very valid notions of 
‘protest’, ‘paradox’, and ‘revolt’ as applied to twentieth-century theatre – perhaps not 
necessarily focusing on drama alone but instead contemplating the diverse philosophical 
ideas and literary genres related to the absurd – in light of more recent readings of the 
                                                 
38 The Theatre of Revolt, p. 4. 
39 Ibid., p. 8. 
40 Ibid., p. 31. 
41 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 




practitioners of the absurd as being altogether more sanguine and constructive, of which 
Bennett is the latest and most vocal proponent.44 Bennett rightly contends that absurdist 
works teach us that ‘it is up to us, through our defiance, revolt, and contemplation, to 
make our lives meaningful’.45 This statement strikes a fine balance between expressing 
outrage over one’s absurd condition or circumstances and steering it towards a positive 
outcome. 
 However, for the most part Bennett downplays or even neglects the element of 
revolt and resistance.46 Instead, he concentrates his efforts on demonstrating his belief in 
the upbeat nature of absurdist works.47 This is well illustrated by his serious attempt to 
                                                 
44 Bennett, Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd. See also Michael Y. Bennet, The 
Cambridge Introduction to Theatre and Literature of the Absurd (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
45 Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd, p. 10. 
46 Although sometimes it surfaces in unexpected ways, as when Bennett rather originally 
and certainly defiantly sees in absurdist works a ‘revolt against existentialism’ (Ibid., p. 
2). Bearing in mind the actual tenets held by prominent self-proclaimed existentialists 
(see for example The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Robert Audi, third 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 343-44), this claim perhaps 
presupposes that here and elsewhere the term ‘existentialism’ be read (as is often the case 
in everyday usage) as a byword for nihilism. 
47 This hypothesis, according to Bennett, serves as a foil to Esslin’s supposedly ‘bleak’ 
views, which lead one to read the plays he analyses as being suffused with ‘a sense of 
hopelessness’ (Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd, p. 16). This not wholly inaccurate 
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rationalise such a decidedly optimistic reading by leaning on the allegedly hopeful mood 
of postwar Europe due to the Marshall Plan and the ‘incredible economic growth’.48 This 
article proposes to meet these three critics halfway by taking the line of thought initiated 
by Wellwarth and Brustein in the more positive direction indicated by Bennett, without 
losing sight of the momentous importance of the idea of revolt. 
 But what is the exact nature of such revolt? Addressing this knotty issue is the 
second main aim of this article. As we shall see, there are as many answers to this 
question as there are artists who could be considered ‘absurdist’. Nevertheless, all of 
those individual revolts have a common spring in a few world-changing historical 
developments. 
 
2. A BACKGROUND: ON MODERNITY, REASON AND FAITH 
The absurd is a key aspect of modernity.49 But to what extent is it a part of it, and to what 
extent is it a reaction to it? Any attempt to truly grapple with this question ought to be 
preceded by an explanation of what is meant by ‘modernity’. This article, however, is 
only tangentially concerned with this famously slippery concept, and therefore no attempt 
will be made to actually define modernity. Instead, the emphasis will lie entirely on 
modernity’s slightly less controversial philosophical origins. 
                                                                                                                                                 
but decidedly simplistic interpretation, though rife in absurd criticism, fails to do justice 
to Esslin’s more nuanced thesis (see for example The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 313). 
48 Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd, p. 16; see also The Cambridge Introduction to 
Theatre and Literature of the Absurd, pp. 36-38. 
49 Cornwell, The Absurd in Literature, p. 74. 
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 Modernity is inextricably linked to the Enlightenment. Anthony Pagden argues 
that ‘[m]odernity was the creature of a great many intellectual and scientific 
configurations, from the invention of the steam engine to the Internet, very little of which 
can be attributed to the Enlightenment’; ‘What can be attributed to it, however, is the 
broadly secular, experimental, individualistic, and progressive intellectual world that 
ultimately made those innovations possible’.50 The Enlightenment, then, ‘was the true 
beginning of modernity, as an open-ended, continuing progression, subject to constant 
scrutiny and reevaluation’.51 Jonathan Israel, author of several works on the 
Enlightenment, fully concurs: ‘The Enlightenment, I maintain, was the most important 
and profound intellectual, social, and cultural transformation of the Western world since 
the Middle Ages and the most formative in shaping modernity. […] The product of a 
particular era, it has profoundly affected every aspect of modernity’.52 
 There is one particular aspect of the Enlightenment which is of vital importance 
for this article: its emphasis on Reason. Israel argues convincingly that the ‘interlocking 
complex of abstract concepts’ associated with the ‘making of modernity’ is 
‘predominantly (but not exclusively) derived from the Radical Enlightenment’.53 This is 
                                                 
50 The Enlightenment: And Why It Still Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
p. viii. 
51 Ibid., p. 10. 
52 Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution and Human Rights 1750-1790 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 3. 
53 Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-
1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 52. 
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not immaterial for future absurdists, given ‘the Radical Enlightenment’s complete 
elimination of theological criteria and unrestricted application of reason to everything we 
know’.54 As a result, the Enlightenment would be defined by its promotion of a 
‘fundamental belief in the power of reason’, which ‘would free humankind from 
ignorance and superstition’.55 Thus ‘[m]odernity and rationality are interconnected in a 
conceptually compulsory manner in that both notions stand in an intrinsic and internal 
relation to one another’, so much so that, for Jürgen Habermas, ‘postmodernism, as a 
farewell to modernity and its discourse as a whole, would of necessity represent a 
departure from rationality’.56 
 Little wonder that when, in the second half of the twentieth century, some 
Western scholars pounced on what they perceive as the dark side of modernity, ‘Reason’ 
too became a target. Israel summarizes this development in an illuminating passage worth 
quoting at length: 
 
Meanwhile, a growing tendency, from the 1970s onwards, to contest the validity 
of the ‘Enlightenment’s’ ideals and see its laying the intellectual foundations of 
modernity in a negative rather than a positive light has, at the same time, caused 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 Andrew Koch, ‘Rationality, Romanticism and the Individual: Max Weber’s 
“Modernism” and the Confrontation with “Modernity”’, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 26 (1993), 123-44 (p. 123). 
56 Rodolphe Gasché, ‘Postmodernism and Rationality’, The Journal of Philosophy, 85 
(1988), 528-38 (p. 528). 
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an escalating ‘crisis of the Enlightenment’ in historical and philosophical 
studies. In particular, Postmodernist thinkers have argued that its abstract 
universalism was ultimately destructive, that the relentless rationalism, concern 
with perfecting humanity, and universalism of what they often disparagingly 
called ‘the Enlightenment project’ was responsible for the organized mass 
violence of the later French Revolution and the still greater horrors perpetrated 
by imperialism, Communism, Fascism, and Nazism in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.57 
 
 Israel proffers as an example ‘Michel Foucault’s overarching and powerful claim 
that the Enlightenment’s insistence on the primacy of reason was ultimately just a mask 
for the exercise of power’.58 This is part of a general trend towards what Rodolphe 
Gasché identifies as ‘the postmodern interrogation of reason’ and the corollary 
‘rediscovery of the irrational’, whose ultimate goal is to put ‘the foundation of Western 
culture into question’.59 As we shall see, though, even before the arrival of Foucault and 
other likeminded theorists, the destructiveness of that ‘relentless rationalism’ – and its not 
only philosophical but also social, political, and even metaphysical consequences – 
would be at the very heart of the grievances of many absurdist artists. 
 This is not to say that they were pioneers in their distrust of rationality. In fact, 
‘[a]lmost from the beginning, the [Enlightenment’s] stress on reason sparked currents of 
                                                 
57 Democratic Enlightenment, p. 1. 
58 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
59 ‘Postmodernism and Rationality’, p. 530. 
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discontent and uneasiness’, and it would not be long until ‘[a] romantic movement 
emerged to challenge the primacy of “rationality” in the Enlightenment view of human 
nature’.60 Caught between those two clashing worldviews was a very significant thinker 
of modernity: Max Weber. Andrew Koch has produced a fine account of Weber’s 
conundrum: in short, the writings of the German sociologist and political economist ‘are 
marked by a tension between the requirements of Kantian rationalism and the demands of 
Weber’s personal value commitments’, that is to say, by ‘the conflict between his 
commitment to both modern rationalist epistemology and a romantic ontology’.61 
 This resulted from Weber’s perception of ‘rationality’ as a double-edged sword: 
on the one hand, it ‘had been the foundation for an improved understanding of the 
environment’; on the other hand, ‘the march of “rational culture” was diminishing the 
worth of the individual and eroding the prospects for social development’.62 According to 
Koch, then, ‘Weber did not fully accept the priority of “rationalism” in human life, but at 
the same time he was not willing to give up the modernist paradigm of rational science. 
He sought a synthesis that would explain both the rational process of human 
understanding and the emotional commitments that he defined as essential components of 
the human personality’.63 
 Alas, this conciliatory urge eventually gave in to what for Weber was the 
overwhelming evidence: ‘Weber was forced to conclude that tension, anomie and 
                                                 
60 Koch, ‘Rationality, Romanticism and the Individual’, p. 123. 
61 Ibid., p. 124. 
62 Ibid., p. 132. 
63 Ibid., p. 125. 
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dehumanization are the result of modernity and the march of “objective” reason’, ‘that 
the march of “science” and bureaucracy were inevitable and that “modernity” itself 
represented a valueless, nihilistic void’.64 
 These conclusions are far from consensual, but they would clearly resonate with 
many disillusioned artists – and stir them into revolt against rationality. For Fotiade, the 
twentieth century’s ‘single unifying, pervasive concern with the Absurd’ is ‘perhaps less 
astonishing than the overall persistence of wilful attempts at questioning the validity of 
the classical rationalist discourse’65 – and the two phenomena are most certainly related. 
In fact, the former elicits the latter, and the latter reinforces the former: the result is ‘a 
process by which reason comes to turn against itself and redeploy its violence against its 
own grounding principles’, which in turn ‘opens up the possibility of “awakening”’, or 
self-awareness.66 
 This backlash against rationality is one of the ways that avant-garde artists 
preoccupied with the absurd deal with ‘the problem of modernity’, that is to say, the fact 
that ‘[t]he modern lifeworld is fragmented by the habits of rationality and colonized by 
systems that tend to override close, personal communication and even, to a considerable 
                                                 
64 Ibid., pp. 125, 143. 
65 Conceptions of the Absurd, p. 1. 
66 Ibid., p. 68. Though it is unfortunate that most critics of absurdist literature and drama 
focus almost exclusively on that ‘negative, self-destructive movement’ (Ibid.), in 
detriment to its positive, constructive outcome (what Fotiade terms the ‘awakening’). 
Bennett is a noteworthy exception (see Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd and The 
Cambridge Introduction to Theatre and Literature of the Absurd). 
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degree, language’.67 But rationality (here meant specifically in Weber’s sense) would 
hasten yet another cataclysm, one which – for some, spearheaded by Esslin – in essence 
links its origins (the ‘Reason’ of the Enlightenment) with its upshot (the absurdity of 
modern times): the death of God. 
 The steady ‘decline of religious faith’ in the West68 is one of the momentous 
phenomena that can be traced back to the Enlightenment; it is no coincidence that, as 
‘religious doubt became a serious, widespread concern’ in nineteenth-century Britain, 
‘Enlightenment arguments about rationalism, rights, and scientific method had circulated 
decades earlier, especially in continental Europe’.69 
 The link between the two is causal – and unexpectedly complex. It is often 
supposed that reason, believed by the Enlightenment’s philosophers to ‘uncover the 
universal principles that govern the world’ and to ‘free humankind from ignorance and 
superstition’,70 would edge religious faith out of its bejewelled throne. This is a perfectly 
valid perspective, but the role of reason in the slow deterioration of religious faith can 
also be approached from another interesting and rather surprising angle, one that focuses 
not on a blind adherence to the precepts of rationality but on the very opposite of that – 
namely a strong suspicion of reason and the subsequent praise of doubt. Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
                                                 
67 Cole Harris, ‘Power, Modernity, and Historical Geography’, Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, 81 (1991), 671-83 (p. 637). 
68 Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 16. 
69 Christopher Lane, The Age of Doubt: Tracing the Roots of Our Religious Uncertainty 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 2, 95. 
70 Koch, ‘Rationality, Romanticism and the Individual’, p. 123. 
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makes a cogent argument for this hypothesis: 
 
Enlightenment thinkers, preoccupied with both individual freedom and secular 
and limited government, argued that human reason is fallible. They understood 
that reason is more than just rational thought; it is also a process of trial and 
error, the ability to learn from past mistakes. The Enlightenment cannot be fully 
appreciated without a strong awareness of just how frail human reason is. That is 
why concepts like doubt and reflection are central to any form of decision-
making based on reason.71 
 
 This brought about a decisive change in the West: ‘Skepticism was no longer 
heresy; it was the sign increasingly of an open, questioning mind. And doubt was no 
longer anathema’.72 Because the sinews of epistemology were so closely entwined with 
metaphysics, the floodgates for agnosticism were flung open. 
 Whatever its causes, ‘the general decline in Christian belief’ in Europe73 is 
nowadays taken for granted, and its repercussions are far-reaching. For John 
Cruickshank, writing before the publication of Esslin’s Theatre of the Absurd, such ‘loss 
of transcendence’ means that, for ‘many modern writers’, ‘the world is characterized by 
                                                 
71 Apud Lane, The Age of Doubt, p. 97. 
72 Lane, The Age of Doubt, p. 149. 
73 John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), p. 6. 
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lack of significance and coherence. Meaning has to be created, not found’.74 Such 
‘erosion – indeed, rejection – of belief’,75 then, essentially ‘pav[ed] the way for atheistic 
existentialism’.76 This transcendental vacuum is prime breeding ground for absurdity; 
hence Esslin’s assertion that the Theatre of the Absurd tackles ‘the absurdity of the 
human condition itself in a world where the decline of religious belief has deprived man 
of certainties’.77 Furthermore, Hinchliffe, in his attempt to better define the subject of his 
book The Absurd, considers it ‘axiomatic that for Absurdity to exist, God must be 
dead’.78 
 There is obviously a very strong correlation between the one and the other, but 
they need not necessarily coexist. Donald Crosby provides an apt example of just that: a 
Christian freshman could not bring himself to write a paper on Plato’s philosophy, 
because he deemed it a waste of time. In his defence, Crosby argues, the student draws on 
the important nihilistic theme ‘that human reason is bankrupt and incapable of resolving 
any of its own significant questions’.79 The consequent absurdity of the world and of the 
human condition leaves no alternative to ‘the essentially arbitrary act of the will the 
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student called “faith”’80 – or, in Camus’s terminology, a ‘leap’. This might strike one as 
being an extreme case, but in fact that line of reasoning is analogous to the one imputed 
to Søren Kierkegaard by Camus in Le Mythe de Sisyphe.81 
 In order to drive home the point that absurdity and faith need not clash, we begin 
the analysis of manifestations of resistance in absurdist works by zooming in on an artist 
whose fierce hostility towards Reason is at least partly motivated by rationality’s bid to 
overthrow metaphysics. 
 
3. DANIIL KHARMS: ‘AGAINST KANT’ 
The term ‘absurdist literature’ may very well be ‘ill-defined and overplayed’,82 but it has 
proven irresistible for most readers and scholars confronted with any given ‘mini-, non- 
or anti-story’83 written by the Russian avant-garde all-round artist Daniil Kharms (1905-
1942). Matvei Yankelevich, an editor and translator of Kharms’s work, is very 
mistrustful of the label ‘absurdist’, but even he acknowledges the existence of ‘points of 
contact between Kharms and the kind of post-war existential thinkers who sought to 
define the absurd, to employ it as a philosophical category’.84 Indeed, Branko Jakovljevic 
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concedes that the absurdist interpretation of Kharms’s work has been very fruitful,85 
despite considering it to be impervious to that and other kinds of interpretations.86 
Kharms does not merely resist such readings in a passive manner – his posture is one of 
continuous defiance in the face of attempts to establish connections of any sort;87 
moreover, his esteem for useless objects fuels his aesthetics’ ‘resistance to any kind of 
utilization, application or purpose’.88 
 The most obvious manifestation of this can be readily found in the ‘subversion of 
logic and causality’89 which informs practically every single text of Kharms, as well as in 
his theoretical and poetic ‘pronouncements against rationality’.90 And herein lies the 
Kharmsian absurd, one which is grounded not on any existential principles,91 as is the 
case in many Western European absurdist writers, but instead on a ‘resistance to logos’.92 
 The resulting irrationality is far from representing a puerile means to a comical 
end; that is, the use of slapstick and non-sequitur in his micronarratives cannot be 
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properly understood if seen as a facile way of eliciting laughter. As it happens, such 
resistance is the natural consequence of a complex worldview which, Hilary Fink argues, 
is in reality steeped in the ‘deep-rooted tradition in Russian thought of Orthodox 
ontologism’.93 According to this view, any reading of Kharms stands to benefit from the 
acknowledgement of the impact of ‘nineteenth-century Romantic, anti-Enlightenment 
trend in Russian thought and culture’, which is characterized by its ‘distrust of pure 
reason’ and its reaction against ‘a Kantian overreliance on intellect as the sole means of 
attaining knowledge of the external world’.94 Imbued in the ‘historic Russian distrust of 
analytical reason’, and sharing his fellow Russian modernists’ disdain for ‘materialism 
and positivism’, Kharms would write ‘against Kant’ in the marginalia of what is today his 
most famous story (‘Blue Notebook Nº10’), thereby signalling his rejection of ‘the 
restriction of human knowledge to phenomenal perception, excluding the spiritual or 
noumenal element of reality’.95 
 This last aspect is key to understanding Kharms, for whom the question of a 
higher power is far from settled: ‘For all his only too obvious absurdist credentials – the 
incongruity, the linguistic highlighting and the stress on language games, the logical 
inversions and the near (or sheer) nonsense – the Kharmsian œuvre remains in a state of 
spiritual tension’.96 His ‘religious fervor’,97 then, helps explain his animus towards 
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rationality, and being ‘against Kant’ due (at least in part) to the German philosopher’s 
refusal ‘to recognize metaphysical truth, to place it on an equal footing with scientific 
truth’98 clearly sets Kharms apart from the dramatists of the Theatre of the Absurd. 
 Be that as it may, the fact remains that ‘Kharms’s theory of the absurd is based, in 
large part, on his aversion to the notion of causality and so-called logical connection’;99 
the philosophical rejection of rationality is elevated to the status of organizing principle, 
and it is not only present in his diaries and treatises but also given artistic expression in 
his fiction, poetry, and plays. This resistance against such a basic cornerstone of all 
aspects of modernity in general and contemporary society in particular is precisely what 
binds Kharms to many other absurdist writers. 
 Yet there is another, related, more down-to-earth and equally significant kind of 
defiance which we will be analysing in this article: political resistance. The fact that most 
of Kharms’s works appear to be permeated with nonsense, or at least reminiscent of 
Russian zaum poetry, could induce one into believing them to be harmless tales, little 
islands of (non)meaning. As Cornwell points out, however, nonsense can be much more 
subversive than that: ‘Far from always being completely divorced from any semblance of 
surrounding reality, as may be commonly thought, nonsense does tend to interact with 
society or civilisation, whether as an expression of cultural or political alienation, or of 
other forms of oblique comment’.100 
 So is there a muffled cry of ‘political alienation’ in Kharms’s vignettes? 
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Answering to this kind of question can be difficult in a case like Kharms’s, a writer who 
‘rarely, if ever, mentions politics in his writings’.101 Jakovljevic imagines a hypothetical 
reader’s objection to the ‘politicization of an author who vigorously insisted on his 
apolitical positions. I would like to ask them to think again: what does it mean to 
proclaim oneself apolitical in the face of a radical and violent politicization of every facet 
of human, and even non-human, life?’.102 But Peter Boxall, writing on the possibility of a 
political reading of Samuel Beckett, is not content with ‘a critique that insists that even 
apoliticism is in some sense political’,103 and he explains why: ‘If all forms of activity, 
even that of resistance to the category of the political, can be effortlessly co-opted into 
the political, then the meanings of the terms politics and resistance are in danger of being 
effaced’.104 
 Kharms’s politicism or lack thereof is a thorny but crucial issue in Kharmsian 
criticism, and the more scholars weigh in on it, the less unanimity there is. In The Absurd 
in Literature, Cornwell compiles other critics’ opinions on this matter, adding that ‘there 
is little doubt that, in Stalin’s Russia, the experimental prose of Kharms would have been, 
and should have been, construed as subversive’105 – this is a more or less established fact, 
considering the fact that ‘Kharms and several of his friends were arrested and charged 
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with anti-Soviet activities’,106 a direct consequence of the NKVD, the precursor of the 
KGB, having taken a very keen interest on them.107 
 It is not uncommon, then, for the answer to the question asked above to be an 
emphatic ‘yes’. For instance, Fink argues that ‘Kharms’s pointed alogicality may be read 
as a direct political challenge to the enforced Stalinist philosophy of optimistic 
determinism in the 1930s’.108 For Fink, ‘the environment of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s’ 
oozes less than subtly from texts that feature ‘arbitrary brutality and the “illogical” 
disappearance of people in the middle of the night’.109 Ultimately, then, ‘Kharms’s 
prosaic absurd is meant to reflect […] the general incoherence of a world plunged into 
the madness of Stalinism’.110 Craig Brandist goes as far as to declare that Kharms’s 
‘poetics of the absurd are employed in a deconstructive assault on the Stalinist 
monolith’.111 On top of that (and interestingly for the purposes of this article), Brandist 
claims that the Russian writer combines his anti-rationalist agenda with his alleged 
political zeal by pinning absurdity to ‘the adherence of the ruling class to a particular 
form of rationality [which] imposes a grim logic that distorts the whole social world’.112 
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 Even those more critical of the ‘trend […] pervasive in scholarly words’ that 
causes Kharms to be ‘forced into political paradigms’113 go little further than giving a 
subdued rebuttal, one which does not completely preclude the existence of a political 
dimension. Yankelevich does grant that Kharms’s outlook on life and art ‘was 
incompatible with the prevailing ideology’, and that ‘[t]here is much truth to the narrative 
of Kharms’s victimhood at the hands of the Soviet regime’.114 Nonetheless, he finds that 
‘glossing Kharms’s texts as social or political allegory’ has its risks, as ‘implicit in the 
approach of such readings is the belief that they function mimetically, or as “coded” 
messages decrying Soviet life’).115 So while Yankelevich concedes that the political 
aspect of Kharms’s work should be taken into account, he argues for ‘a fuller view of 
[…] a context that did not consist only – or even primarily – of Stalin and politics’.116 
 In the end, however, the general consensus seems to be that Kharms’s resistance, 
besides being prompted by metaphysical and epistemological concerns, is inescapably 
(and most likely even in spite of himself) political as well. One can argue that Kharms is 
a perfect example of how ‘the thematic expression of the absurd split between man and 
his surrounding world’,117 regardless of any lack of topographical detail, explicit satirical 
purpose, or even cause and effect, is virtually indissociable from a confrontation of one’s 
actual cultural, social, and political reality. Around the time of Kharms’s death, as yet 
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another war shook the world, the writer and thinker most dedicated to the notion of the 
absurd would begin to positively embrace such awareness and engagement. 
 
4. ALBERT CAMUS: A POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO THE ABSURD 
Due to the relatively limited scope of this article, there are, admittedly, several 
philosophers whose invaluable contributions to our understanding of the concept of 
absurdity are not discussed at length, Kierkegaard and Sartre being two of the most 
conspicuous absences. But no analysis of the absurd as resistance is at all conceivable 
without taking into consideration the evolution of the thought of Albert Camus (1913-
1960). 
 At times provocative and aphoristic in tone, Camus’s Le Mythe de Sisyphe, first 
published in 1942, represents his most thorough attempt to define the absurd. For Camus, 
it is not the world itself that is absurd; ‘what is absurd is the confrontation of the 
irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. The 
absurd depends as much on man as on the world’ (MS, p. 20). This means that the absurd 
is not an essential state; it is something that depends on perception, on a subject and an 
object, and, most crucially for this article, on the clash between the two: ‘The absurd is 
essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of the elements compared; it is born of their 
confrontation’ (MS, pp. 28-29). As it is, ‘this confrontation between the human need and 
the unreasonable silence of the world’ (MS, p. 26) is impossible to resolve, since those 
two propositions – the ‘appetite for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility of 




 These views reinforce the notion that, regardless of the perspective, rationality (or 
the irrational) is a key aspect of the absurd.118 But whereas Kharms launches an all-out 
attack on rationality, the author of Sisyphe takes a much more measured stance. For 
Camus, extreme rationality and extreme irrationality are both ‘leaps’, so while they may 
provide some comfort (MS, p. 46), it is of an illusory sort, seeing that ‘the world is 
neither so rational nor so irrational. It is unreasonable and only that’ (MS, p. 47). 
 This is a necessary caveat for a philosopher ‘clearly marked’ in his earlier years 
‘as a potential nihilist’,119 all the while vigorously denouncing nihilism. Camus’s 
thoughts on the possibility of art in an absurd world are revealing of this tension: ‘For an 
absurd work of art to be possible, thought in its most lucid form must be involved in it. 
But at the same time thought must not be apparent except as the regulating intelligence’ 
(MS, p. 94). The implication of this is that thought must be the work’s life force and 
simultaneously the target of its repudiation (MS, p. 94); also, the work is created without 
being part of a search for ‘the end, the meaning, and the consolation of a life. Creating or 
not creating changes nothing. The absurd creator does not prize his work. He could 
repudiate it’ (MS, p. 94). 
 The mental gymnastics involved in justifying the creation of a meaningless and 
inconsequential work of art, or the possibility of happiness in absurdity, have caused 
some scholars to criticize his paradoxical response to the absurd as being ‘confusing and 
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confused’.120 In Cruickshank’s opinion, Sisyphe, with all its ‘somewhat sterile 
conclusions’,121 is best remembered as a stepping stone for the later development of 
Camus’s philosophy. Such development would in effect amount to a full and unflinching 
acknowledgement of reality and its prosaic but very pressing threats. For Cruickshank, 
this was the logical solution of the ‘practical and logical difficulties’ of a ‘doctrine of 
fundamental absurdity’;122 Camus would be led by ‘his refusal to make moral 
concessions to intellectual abstractions’123 – which is evident even in Sisyphe, being the 
source of no small amount of friction between the existential nihilist premises and the 
humanist conclusions – and realise that the emphasis would have to lay ‘on concrete 
situations rather than abstract attitudes’.124 
 This change took place in his personal life before it made its way into his writing 
– around the time when he returned to North Africa in 1941.125 Cruickshank notes that, 
although Camus had begun to write the first draft of La Peste around that time,126 ‘the 
writing of La Peste in its final form did not begin until 1944’,127 and the novel ‘would 
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only be finished in 1947’.128 In the meantime, and according to Fred Willhoite Jr., his 
‘active participation in the Resistance’ is certain to ‘have affected his point of view’,129 
and ‘[t]his distinctively individual experience of rebellion’ was ‘later conceptualized by 
Camus in his attempt to delineate its nature and significance’.130 And so it came to pass 
that his personal experience irremediably altered his philosophical system; his ‘newly 
articulated political humanism’ would find expression in La Peste,131 where ‘[t]he moral 
solipsism of the absurd man is somehow broken into by a feeling that his personal revolt 
is grounded in an experience common to his fellows’.132 
 Thus although La Peste is ‘a novel about the absurd’133 it is also, by Camus’s own 
admission, ‘a chronicle of the Resistance’.134 The novel’s political dimension is 
unmistakable yet also intricately intermingled with the absurdist one: there are ‘two 
figurative meanings from the symbol of the plague since there are clear and repeated 
allusions both to the German Occupation and to man’s metaphysical dereliction in the 
world’.135 These two powerful and concurrent meanings illustrate well the tension 
between the absurd and revolt which would feature predominantly in Camus’s later 
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 After the rather abstract musings in Sisyphe and the reflections based on real and 
personally witnessed events in La Peste, in L’Homme révolté (1951) Camus’s evidently 
pivotal concept of resistance to absurdity turned away from detached philosophical 
deliberation and continued to develop ‘along more historical and political lines’.137 In this 
novel, he essentially thematized the making of ‘a vital distinction between the negativity 
(and totality) of nihilism and the at least potential positivity (despite historical events) of 
rebellion’.138 The level of engagement with contemporary society and politics is such that 
one may discuss not merely the possible existence but indeed the exact nature of ‘Camus’ 
political doctrine’.139 This completes the outward development of his philosophy: 
Camus’s all-important concept of rebellion ceases to be ‘only an individual and collective 
refusal of death and absurdity in the name of nature and happiness; it comes to imply 
resistance to physical or political oppression as well’.140 
 It is interesting to see just how much Camus’s idea of resistance differs from 
Kharms’s, given their common starting point: the idea of absurdity. Kharms welcomes 
the absurd as a part of life, but also as a means of resistance against the stifling 
rationality, indeed as evidence of the stubborn survival of God – ‘The world is absurd, 
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and therefore faith is possible’.141 Moreover, the Russian writer never seemed keen on 
getting overtly mixed up in politics, even in the comparatively safe context of his utopian 
project for a domestic journal.142 
 Camus too considers the acknowledgement of absurdity a sine qua non, but he 
turns Kharms’s equation on its head; his ‘belief and trust in reason’143 lead him to argue 
instead for the instrumentalization of rationality (in due moderation, as we have seen) 
against absurdity. Furthermore, this, Camus contends, should be done in a decidedly 
concrete way: although more existentialist (and atheistic) in nature than any of Kharms’s 
more perfunctory statements, his call for a ‘protracted protest against death’144 is to be 
answered as much by a general rebellion against the absurdity of the human condition as 
by a steely defiance of repression of any kind and a strong disavowal of the nihilistic 
principles which, according to Camus, prop up totalitarian ideologies and regimes. 
 Also unlike Kharms, the French-Algerian philosopher, in his search for a new 
paradigm, never seems much interested in challenging literary conventions. During his 
last decade among the living, several dramatic works would convey concerns similar to 
his own, but they would go ‘a step further’ than him and Sartre not only by integrating 
the absurd into the content of their texts but also by having the absurd influence their 
form.145 That was one way many European avant-garde artists found to rebel against not 
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only the intrinsic frailty but also the extrinsic oppression of human beings – be they lost 
in the vast context of an indifferent universe or trapped in the narrow confines of a prison 
cell for political dissidents. 
 
5. THE THEATRE OF THE ABSURD AND OTHER ABSURDITIES 
‘If a definition of the philosophy of absurdist drama were articulated’, Anne Quinney 
writes, ‘it would include the expression of the belief in a godless universe where human 
existence has no meaning or purpose, where all communication breaks down, and where 
logical construction and argument give way to both irrational and illogical speech’.146 
This attempt at definition – with which most scholars on the absurd would likely agree, 
regardless of their feelings towards their subject matter – is accurate and gloomy in equal 
measure, in that it is mostly accurate, but not necessarily holy writ, and it is rather 
gloomy, but not necessarily (or indeed almost ever) to the point of sentimentalist despair 
or nihilistic indifference – and this is part of its accuracy. One of the aims of this article is 
precisely to challenge the image of absurdist literature as a bleak, languid, whimsical, 
getting-nowhere-fast requiem by demonstrating its sheer vitality. Such energy, so the 
argument goes, is inevitable given its reactive thrust and its expression of an irrepressible 
dissatisfaction, be it the searing Weltschmerz caused by the absurdity of the human 
condition or the out-and-out rage against a particular sociopolitical status quo. 
 Some of the best known works from authors associated with Esslin’s Theatre of 
the Absurd are perfect examples of this, in particular Eugène Ionesco’s Rhinocéros. It has 
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all the trappings of absurdist drama (it is set in a godless universe, communication breaks 
down, logic and reason give way to the irrational), and yet it is, very plainly, a political 
allegory. Critics like Richard Danner, whose bold opening gambit in an article is that 
‘Rhinocéros is not an allegory’,147 have to fight not only the bulk of the play’s actual 
textual evidence but also the opinion of Ionesco himself. ‘Unless he has been deliberately 
mystifying us, his assessment of the import of Rhinocéros is clear’: for its writer, 
‘Rhinocéros is indeed allegorical’.148 His ‘extensive and quite specific’ remarks on the 
matter149 include the rather categorical claim that Rhinocéros is ‘sans doute une pièce 
antinazie’.150 The idea of the Author with capital ‘A’ may or may not be dead, depending 
on one’s theoretical persuasion, but the truth is that ‘Rhinocéros has been read as a satire 
of totalitarianism, the police state, and demagogy as well as a moral call to question the 
rise of these phenomena in the twentieth century’, and its ‘hyperbole and outrageous 
fantasy have been read as metaphors for historical events of the twentieth century – 
ranging from the Nazi occupation of France to the French persecution of Algerians’.151 
 Other instances of political satire and allegory abound, especially in Eastern 
Europe. Many critics have noted both the ‘East European dissident ambiance’152 and the 
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fact that, despite their undeniably absurd character, Eastern European absurdist plays are 
manifestly tethered to their immediate sociopolitical context. This is why Goetz-
Stankiewicz maintains that ‘[t]he playful dictum “Nothing is as exciting as the truth” 
could be considered the all but playful motto of absurd theatre in Eastern Europe’.153 
 For example, Cornwell notes that Poland is home to ‘a number of fascinating 
practitioners of the surreal and the absurd’, citing Stanislaw Witkiewicz, Bruno Schulz, 
and the early work of Witold Gombrowicz as noteworthy examples.154 Edward 
Czerwinski, in his article on Tadeusz Różewicz, argues that ‘Różewicz, like Mickiewicz, 
Słowacki, Norwid, and Wyspiański, to mention only those of the mainstream, has 
transposed the contemporary Polish scene with all its problems onto the universal stage 
of the Theater of the Absurd’.155 Czerwinski too mentions Witkiewicz, who ‘is regarded 
as a precursor of the Theater of the Absurd’, and sees in Jerzy Broszkiewicz and 
Sławomir Mrożek ‘two of Poland’s finest dramatists writing in the idiom of the Theater 
of the Absurd’.156 
 Another case in point is Czechoslovakia. ‘The “Thaw” years in Czechoslovakia’, 
writes Cornwell, ‘saw an influx of absurdist theatre’.157 Forerunners of this trend include 
Josef and Karel Čapek, thanks to their ‘science-fiction robot saga R.U.R. (1920) and the 
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satirical “Entomological Review” drama The Insect Play’.158 For Cornwell, the intent of 
these plays is political, though ‘not only, or merely, political’.159 The most illustrious 
example of absurdist drama in Czechoslovakia is Václav Havel, a celebrated writer 
turned politician160 capable of blending in his works ‘avant-garde dramaturgy’ with 
‘political satire’, whose intent is ‘to expose the absurdities of the socialist system in 
particular’.161 
 There is a myriad of notable, more isolated instances of absurdist works in which 
social and political criticism plays an important role. Debating possible reasons for Irish 
man of letters Brian O’Nolan’s adaptation of the Čapek brothers’ The Insect Play, 
Cornwell speculates that O’Nolan, an absurdist writer with a ‘dim view of the Irish 
political scene and its machinations’,162 ‘must have seen a parallel worth drawing 
between the post-first-World-War ethos of The Insect Play […] and a confused Second 
World War (nominally neutral) situation pertaining in Ireland, twenty years after the Irish 
civil war’.163 The works of women absurdist writers such as Liudmila Petrushevskaia and 
Margaret Hollingsworth are also worthy of note, due to their politically-aware brand of 
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absurdism which includes a keen exploration of gender dynamics.164 Portugal, under 
dictatorship, saw Jaime Salazar Sampaio write in 1961 O Pescador à Linha, an allegory 
in which Sampaio surreptitiously inserted elements of protest with clearly political 
implications.165 Absurdist incursions into politics have likewise been undertaken ‘by, in 
very different ways, Pinter, Stoppard and, say, Edward Bond’.166 Lastly, reference should 
also be made to Benedikts Kalnačs’s identification of the absurd as one of the six kinds of 
‘characteristic manifestations of anti-colonial thought in the Baltic countries’.167 
 It may be surprising at first sight, but in truth the connection between the absurd 
and anti-colonialism is perfectly defensible. Odun Balogun, in his article on absurdist 
African literature, argues that, although ‘there are not as many absurdist artists in Africa 
as in Europe and America’,168 it is nevertheless a force to be reckoned with. According to 
Balogun, the absurd ‘has always been manifest in African literature both oral and 
written’,169 and its presence in contemporary African literature is seen as ‘a manifestation 
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of the world-wide malaise dominating all spheres of modern life’;170 this is highly 
reminiscent of Esslin, and indeed the European absurdist tradition is credited by Balogun 
with having a decisive influence171 – much to the chagrin of ‘vocal African critics’ of 
such perceived eurocentrism, who ‘have persistently condemned the encouragement of 
modernist tendencies in African writing’.172 
 However, Balogun posits that contemporary absurdist African literature is also ‘a 
product of a specific historical and racial experience molded by slavery, colonization, and 
neo-colonialism’,173 and it is easy to understand why: ‘The high level of misgovernment’ 
means that ‘the reality of post-Independence is a far cry from the utopian heaven it 
seemed to promise’,174 and ‘[t]he degree of pessimism and cynicism [in] this disparity 
between expectations and reality’175 is certainly akin to the sort of dissension and 
discontent that ignites the more politically-minded absurdist plays. 
 But even though Balogun argues that contemporary African literature of the 
absurd ‘developed as a reaction to the general world malaise and the absurd conditions of 
modern Africa’176 (a combination that is very much akin to the factors that characterize 
the Eastern European Theatre of the Absurd, for instance), he also claims that ‘African 
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absurdist literature […] differs in style from the European tradition’.177 Instead of relying 
on ‘absurd form’ to ‘reflect absurd content’, ‘modern African absurdist writers use 
normal, rational and realistic devices combined with hyperbole, irony and satire to 
convey the absurd’.178 
 This ‘“unabsurdist” mode of presenting the absurd’ is the dominating feature of 
the ‘African modern practice of the absurd’,179 and Balogun enumerates some of its most 
significant practitioners: Tutuola, whose The Palm-Wine Drinkard (1953) is best read 
allegorically;180 Femi Osofisan, who in Kolera Kolej (1975) depicts ‘a world ruled by an 
absurd logic […] in a highly lucid and realistic language’;181 Kole Omotoso, who in the 
combat (1972) portrays the gradual shift from logic to illogicality in an ‘even more 
realistic’ and subtle manner than Osofian;182 and Taban lo Liyong, ‘an exciting African 
avant-garde writer’183 whose short fiction not only includes instances of ‘lexical and 
semantic absurdity’ and ‘absurdity of illogical reasoning’184 but also ‘an obvious satire of 
African heads of state’.185 Balogun singles out Taban lo Livong for praise, asserting that 
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‘Africans who read [the story] “Fixions” will become more critical of their puppet-heads 
of state’.186 ‘The corrective objective of African absurdist literature’,187 Balogun argues, 
is particularly evident in Taban lo Livong’s work: ‘His stories are comprehensible and 
purposeful. They present absurdity not as the summation of life but as a comment on the 
negative aspects of life, and their objective is both satiric and corrective’.188 
 The claim, then, is that ‘the absurd for the African fulfills the same purpose as 
satire – a way of correction. The African absurdist may have a pessimistic cynical vision 
but he has not yet despaired’.189 This attitude, for Balogun, is in stark contrast with the 
one held by the ‘European absurdist’, who is described as an incorrigible nihilist in all but 
name.190 Hopefully, this article will have provided enough examples to the contrary for 
there not to be any need to address this particular issue in further detail. 
 Yet it is clear that, in much of absurd criticism (some important exceptions being 
Cornwell and Bennett),191 the spectre of Esslin’s Theatre of the Absurd looms large, and 
the negative definitions it sparks are often too Manichean to be accurate, and therefore 
useful. In the last section of this article, we will address the second main aim of this paper 
by looking at what separates and what unites the different conceptions of the absurd in 
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6. THE TOXICITY OF TAXONOMIES, AND THE QUEST FOR COMMON 
GROUND 
Martin Esslin is fairly clear on what he perceives to be the ‘dual purpose’ of the Theatre 
of the Absurd.192 One of them, ‘the most easily accessible, and therefore most widely 
recognized’, is ‘the satirical exposure of the absurdity of inauthentic ways of life’.193 This 
is the facet of the absurd we have delved into in more depth in the previous section. Yet 
Esslin regards this ‘social criticism’ as ‘far from being its most essential or most 
significant feature’ – that would be the thematization of the universal condition of 
humankind, ‘man stripped of the accidental circumstances of social position or historical 
context, confronted with the basic choices, the basic situations of his existence’.194 
 According to this notion, then, the most important common denominator of the 
miscellaneous plays examined in The Theatre of the Absurd is the existential question, 
and consequently the political dimension of the Eastern European practitioners’ works 
(which is acknowledged and briefly analysed by Esslin himself) is subsidiary, as it were. 
For critics more focused on the Eastern European variant of the Theatre of the Absurd, 
the balance of power between these two sides is inverted: according to Goetz-
Stankiewicz, ‘the best writers of Eastern Europe’ use absurdity as a cover, a weapon for 
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political attack,195 and a tool to ‘address themselves directly to their audiences’, who are 
‘denied the truth’, ‘whose minds have been choked with slogans, and whose lives are 
dictated by irrational absolute values’.196 
 These two views cannot be said to be in contradiction, because Esslin’s study is 
firmly anchored in the Parisian literary scene in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, and the phenomenon examined by Goetz-Stankiewicz pertains mostly to 
works written by writers from countries under Soviet cultural and political influence 
throughout the Cold War. For all the provisos and qualifications, there remains a fault 
line in scholarly research on the absurd which tends to divide a metaphysical West and a 
politically engaged East. The impetus of the theory put forward by Esslin and later 
developed by other scholars is at the same time universalistic and inward-looking, with 
an emphasis on the blurring (or downright neglect) of national cultures’ borders, 
histories, and contemporary realities; conversely, the definition of the Eastern European 
version of the Theatre of the Absurd is much more topical, and often made in negative 
relation to its Western counterpart197 – or, more accurately put, to the concept advocated 
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 Most of the literary critics mentioned in this paper offer such generalizations as a 
helpful rule of thumb, not as dogma. However, given the absurd’s famous elusiveness (of 
which this article is surely further evidence), its literary manifestations are of such varied 
nature that even generalizations are prone to fail. Hinchliffe’s idea that true absurdity is 
not conceivable without loss of faith rules out of consideration the likes of Kierkegaard, 
Kharms, and, in a way, Flann O’Brien. Even the ‘universalist’ and ‘existentialist’ 
dimensions, so often considered key to the Theatre of the Absurd in particular and the 
feeling of absurdity in general, is none too seldom lacking. The case of Kharms is again 
paradigmatic, and reading Ionesco’s Rhinocéros primarily from an existentialist 
perspective requires a leap of sorts. 
 This may help explain the relative dearth of attempts at defining the absurd. Since 
the 1960s, a decade that bore witness to Esslin’s ground-breaking thesis, Brustein’s 
ambitious account of modern drama, and Wellwarth’s penchant for categorical 
statements, few have ventured to pinpoint what exactly can be said to bind together 
playwrights, novelists, and thinkers from such disparate backgrounds. The prudent critic 
attempting to provide a general account of the absurd in literature and drama may 
compile many possible definitions without ever settling on one, which is the path chosen 
by Cornwell in his encyclopaedic study on the subject; or else may shy away from a 
thematic reading and prefer to focus on strictly formal aspects, an approach recently 
favoured by Bennett. As modi operandi, both are quite sensible: besides being capable of 
yielding useful insights, either of them represents a particularly tempting choice when 
one considers the sheer heterogeneity of the practitioners of the absurd and their 
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motivations and worldviews. 
 One of the most intriguing illustrations of that heterogeneity is embodied in a 
single writer: Samuel Beckett (1906-1989). Beckett is consistently pronounced apolitical, 
though that appears to be an oversimplification (see Boxall); Beckett’s work for the 
Resistance is just one example of how his ‘political consciousness, while never flaunted, 
never faltered’.198 So claims that Beckett’s work has a ‘universal’ quality to it do not 
stand up to scrutiny for long. Furthermore, most interesting for this article is his novel 
Watt, much maligned by the author himself199 and best summed up as ‘a metaphysical 
quest, or parody thereof, whereby Watt, applying logic and reason in accordance with the 
Cartesian “Method”, finds that rational attempts to understand his master through his 
accidents leads not to substantive knowledge but to the asylum’.200 It is a vicious 
indictment of ‘the validity of the classical rationalist discourse’, and there is precious 
little in the way of existential angst over man’s predicament. Even so, ‘[t]he 
philosophical underpinning of Watt may well be as absurdist, or as apparently nihilistic, 
as much else in Beckett’s œuvre’, and it may ‘be seen as in many ways the epitome of 
Beckettian absurdism’.201 
 Another telling example is Sławomir Mrożek, whose works, in accordance with 
the retroactively established precepts of the Eastern European Theatre of the Absurd, 
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contain a sustained political onslaught.202 Notwithstanding, Daniel Gerould has found a 
crucial parallel between Mrożek’s ‘obsession with dialectical polarities of nature and 
culture, instinct and reason’ and the ‘characteristics typical of many French writers in the 
Age of Enlightenment’.203 Gerould actually sets ‘Mrozek’s relationship to the theatre of 
the absurd’ in opposition with ‘his critique of extreme rationalism’, which ‘has its roots 
in the eighteenth century’.204 
 As a matter of fact, these two facets of Mrożek’s need not clash. Indeed, they may 
be symbiotic. When the sundry authors and works associated with the absurd are viewed 
together, a pattern emerges: they all have rationality, or the irrational, at the heart of their 
concerns. Perhaps the one thing they will often have in common is not existentialist 
anxiety, nor rejection of transcendentalism, nor use of nonsense, nor explicit political 
engagement, but rather what Gerould calls the ‘critique of extreme rationalism’. 
 This is not to say that all absurdist literary and dramatic texts are explicitly or 
mainly about Reason. Nevertheless, it is interesting how most of those works seem to be 
engaging with the philosophical debate around rationality. To consider but one viable line 
of inquiry, one need only compare the concerns of absurdist writers with those of Max 
Weber. Weber’s prescient critique provides warnings against the many nefarious 
consequences of hyperrationality, such as the ‘disenchantment’ so loathed by Kharms; 
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the rational mechanisation abhorred by Weber205 as much as by twentieth-century Eastern 
European artists;206 and the bureaucratic ‘rational culture’ whose famous iron cage 
‘erodes the possibility for freedom as it destroys the possibility for truly individual 
conduct’207 and is therefore so inimical to the existentialist concerns of many 
practitioners of the absurd discussed by Esslin and Cornwell. 
 One could elaborate on this line of thought and plausibly argue that the ‘critique 
of extreme rationalism’, or the ‘interrogation of reason’, can either be voiced in a pure 
form, uncompromising and thoroughgoing (for example, Kharms and other members of 
OBERIU, the Western European Theatre of the Absurd, Beckett’s Watt); or with due 
reservations, limiting itself to a denunciation of the excesses of rationality (for example, 
Camus, the Eastern European Theatre of the Absurd, the African writers analysed by 
Balogun). Either way, though, there seems to be a common denominator, a unifying 
factor. This shows just how shrewd it is of Fotiade to link the twentieth century’s ‘single 
unifying, pervasive concern with the Absurd’ with the ‘wilful attempts at questioning the 
validity of the classical rationalist discourse’.208 
 Having said that, the fact that the critique of reason is carried out with varying 
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degrees of enthusiasm among practitioners of the absurd209 means that a more complex 
definition of the resistance(s) present in absurdist literature and drama is called for, and it 
might be more productive to take a leaf out of Wim Tigges’s book. Tigges claims that 
there are two main types of literary nonsense, the ‘Learic’ and ‘Carrollian’ types;210 
although they are more or less opposites, there is a fair amount of overlap between 
them,211 and Tigges suggests that the best literary nonsense is the one that ‘which does 
not easily fall to one side of the scale’.212 
 Seeing the interplay between absurdity, rationality and resistance through a 
spectrum can be very fruitful. In such a configuration, one camp, led by Kharms, would 
think of the absurd – partially inspired by Fotiade’s notion of the ‘logically 
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unverifiable’,213 for the purposes of this working definition the absurd may simply be that 
which reason and logic cannot contain, reach or explain – as a useful tool for the 
resistance of reason; the other camp, led by Camus, would stand for the resistance of 
absurdity through reason. 
 In this scenario, the golden mean would be the works that best show the 
possibilities of overlap between both camps. Due to its richness and intricacy, it could be 
argued, following Tigges’s suggestion, that the best absurdist writing is to be found in the 
intersection of the Kharms-Camus Venn diagram. And it is safe to assume that Beckett, 
the most consistently lauded writer associated with the absurd, and often deemed its key 
and link,214 would enjoy pride of place in the middle of that road. Such a position in the 
spectrum necessarily entails paradox, which is the defining feature of this golden mean: 
there is a permanent dialectical tension between the dissatisfaction with absurdity and the 
inadequacy of reason, the need to communicate and the failure of language, a certain 
philosophical detachment and a perhaps surreptitious political engagement.215 The 
perplexing and ‘defiant valuation of powerlessness, defeat, resignation, and 
                                                 
213 Conceptions of the Absurd, p. 54. 
214 Bennett, Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd, p. 18. 
215 The relevance – indeed significance – of the paradox for absurdist literature, though 
originally but imperfectly addressed by Wellwarth, is much more insightfully explored by 
Bennett: ‘The plays of the Theatre of the Absurd were made up of a clatter of different 
viewpoints. These differing viewpoints, usually unresolved, created the paradoxical 
world of the play. What heightened the paradox was the fact that not only were the 
differing viewpoints unresolved, but largely, so was the play’ (ibid., pp. 18-19). 
49 
 
disengagement, which uncovered a paradoxical notion of revolt’ originally ascribed to 
existential thought of the interwar years by Fotiade216 can also be said to play a crucial 
role in much of Beckett’s later œuvre. 
 Thus in Beckett, as in other absurdist writings, ‘I can’t go on’ must immediately 
be followed by ‘I’ll go on’.217 And it is precisely this attitude that unites the practitioners 
of the absurd: common to Kharms, Camus, and Beckett is their disruptive fervour, and 
the inescapable imperative to resist, to subvert, never to surrender, be it to soul-eroding 
hyperrationality or to the absurdity of life (generally speaking or in a particular 
sociopolitical context); the imperative, as it were, to ‘go on’. 
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